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Abstract
In this paper, we provide a formal framework for studying the empirical content of
a given theory. We define the falsifiable closure of a theory to be the least weakening
of the theory that makes only falsifiable claims. The falsifiable closure is our notion
of empirical content. We prove that the empirical content of a theory can be exactly
captured by a certain kind of axiomatization, one that uses axioms which are universal
negations of conjunctions of atomic formulas. The falsifiable closure operator has the
structure of a topological closure, which has implications, for example, for the behavior
of joint vis a vis single hypotheses.
The ideas here are useful for understanding theories whose empirical content is well-
understood (for example, we apply our framework to revealed preference theory, and
Afriat’s theorem), but they can also be applied to theories with no known axiomatization.
We present an application to the theory of multiple selves, with a fixed finite set of selves
and where selves are aggregated according to a neutral rule satisfying independence of
irrelevant alternatives. We show that multiple selves theories are fully falsifiable, in the
sense that they are equivalent to their empirical content.
JEL classification numbers: A10,D00
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1 Introduction
Falsifiability has been a hallmark of the scientific method at least since Popper (1959).
The predictive power of a theory is only as good as the falsifiable claims that it makes.
Any two theories making the same falsifiable claims are observationally equivalent. This
paper is an axiomatic study of the empirical content of a theory.
Most economic theories make some falsifiable claims, but not all its claims may be
falsifiable. An example that would be familiar to most economists is the theory of utility
maximization. If we imagine that we can observe data on choices among pairs, then we
can test for the transitivity of preference: transitivity is a testable implication of the
theory of utility maximization. But we cannot test for the existence of a rationalizing
utility. In fact, it turns out that the theory of utility maximization has the same empirical
content as the theory of preference maximization.1 In the terminology of our paper,
the theory of preference maximization is the falsifiable closure of the theory of utility
maximization. The falsifiable closure is our notion of empirical content.
Some theories make only falsifiable claims. Such theories are called falsifiably com-
plete; one example is the theory of preference maximization (although this depends on
the possible data taken as primitive, as we explain below). A theory is falsifiably com-
plete if all claims it makes can be refuted empirically. One can weaken a theory by, in a
sense, discarding some of its claims, until it becomes falsifiably complete. The falsifiable
∗Chambers and Echenique acknowledge support from the NSF through grant SES-0751980.
1Our discussion in the introduction is necessarily very loose. Example 3 presents these theories more
rigorously.
closure of a theory is the least such weakening. A theory is falsifiably complete if it coin-
cides with its falsifiable closure; eliminating any of its claims results in an observationally
distinct theory.
Our main result is a syntactic characterization of falsifiable closure, and of falsifiably
complete theories. This allows us to understand the syntax (the formal structure) of
axioms that ensure falsifiable completeness, and that characterize the empirical content
of a theory. We apply our results to theories from behavioral economics and social choice;
theories that were not previously known to be fully testable.
The data that can be observed is a primitive of our model. For example, consider
again the theory of preference maximization. It matters whether we believe that we can
observe weak preference only (an alternative x is weakly preferred to y), or if we can also
observe strict preference. It also matters whether we can observe absence of preference:
do we allow observations of the type “x is not preferred to y?”
We restrict the possible data by assuming a language. For example, if we want to
assume that we can observe preference and absence of preference, then we can assume
that we have two symbols R and R˜; we intend to use R to denote a binary relation
expressing weak preference, and R˜ to denote absence of weak preference.2 We may
hypothesize the seemingly tautological statement that between any pair, there is either
preference or absence of preference, and never both. This illustrates the role language
plays in our framework. The key here is that our language needs to be rich enough to
allow us to discern between absence of an observation of preference, and the observation
of absence of preference.
Given a language, we can write axioms expressed in the symbols of the language.
These are the first-order sentences that can be expressed in the language, a notion from
mathematical logic. An axiomatization of a theory is a collection of sentences which hold
at, and only at, each of the particular instances of the theory. We prove that axioms that
have a certain form (universal negations of conjunctions of atomic formulas, or UNCAF)
characterize the empirical content of a theory. So the falsifiable closure of a theory is
axiomatized by UNCAF sentences.
For example, if we use the language with the symbols R and R˜, an UNCAF axiom is
2This is similar to being able to observe both preference and strict preference; however, for formal
exposition, these turn out to be the most tractable primitives, for reasons that will become apparent.
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the following sentence:
∀x∀y∀z¬[(x R y) ∧ (y R z) ∧ (z R˜ x)];
an axiom expressing transitivity.
We show that the falsifiable closure is a topological closure operator on theories. This
is important, as it implies that the intersection of an arbitrary number of falsifiably
complete theories is also falsifiably complete. In other words, no new implications can
be derived from the intersection of the theories; other than those which follow as logical
consequences of the implications already present. On the other hand, the empirical
content of joint hypotheses may be strictly more (i.e. imply stronger restrictions) than the
intersection of the content of each individual hypothesis, but only when these individual
theories are not falsifiably complete.
Our paper formalizes existing ideas and notions. The formalization raises new and
subtle issues, and our results are readily applicable to economic theories. First, we
demonstrate this by characterizing the empirical content of a large body of theories
which as of yet have resisted axiomatization: the theory of multiple selves. We model
the multiple selves hypothesis by assuming a fixed and finite set of selves, each of whom
has a strict preference. The preferences of these selves are aggregated according to a
preference aggregation rule satisfying two very simple hypotheses (neutrality and IIA).
We in fact demonstrate that all such models are equivalent to their empirical content:
they are falsifiably complete, and thus possess an UNCAF axiomatization. This is by
no means a trivial or well-known result, as a special case of it is closely related to the
unsolved dimension problem of order theory: our result shows that the class of orders
having dimension less than n for any fixed n has a very special type of axiomatization;
we believe this result to be previously unknown (see Trotter (1992)).
Secondly, while the results we discuss seem intuitive and many might feel they are
already familiar with the ideas, there are many subtleties involved. In fact, no results can
be true without hypotheses; and in fact, uncovering hypotheses which render the result
true is, in this case, a nontrivial task. For example; Popper (1959) essentially regarded
falsifiable theories and universal theories as equivalent.3 We have shown that universality
of a theory is not in general strong enough to imply falsifiable completeness. We hope that
our formal presentation will aid in understanding the appropriate relationship between
3A universal theory is one which has a universal axiomatization; relying only on universal quantifi-
cation
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observable data, hypotheses, and the axiomatic approach, at least for positive economics.
We do not wish to suggest that theories which are not falsifiably complete are not
economically interesting. Many normative studies recommend situations which cannot
be empirically falsified. An example of an interesting normative theory which is not falsi-
fiable is the theory of egalitarian-equivalence of Pazner and Schmeidler (1978).4 Egalitar-
ian equivalence is a theory of private goods consumption which requires that there exists
some reference bundle for which everyone is indifferent between her own consumption
and the reference bundle. Such a requirement is clearly meant to be prescriptive, rather
than descriptive.
1.1 The basic formal idea
To study the structure of axioms, we need to have a way of talking about axioms as formal
mathematical concepts. The mathematical field of model theory provides us with tools
for such an analysis. Our paper uses definitions and basic ideas from model theory. We
model the data we can observe by a first order language, involving relation and function
symbols. The relation and function symbols should be chosen to correspond to things we
think of as primitive observables. For example if we believe we can observe a preference
between a pair of alternatives, we need to include a relation for that preference; and if we
believe we can observe the absence of preference, we need to include a separate relation
corresponding to absence of preference.
When we speak of a finite data set, we mean a finite set equipped with relations (cor-
responding to the relations) and partial functions (a function whose domain is a subset
of the finite set–corresponding to the function symbols of our language). The data set
involves all elements we have observed to stand in a given relation, as well as the image
of certain elements of our domain under certain functions. In the preference example, we
have no function symbols, and a data set is simply a set with a pair of binary relations
(relating to weak preference and absence of weak preference). The binary relations repre-
sent all observed comparisons. The example illustrates a critical assumption underlying
our work: we do not want to equate non-observation of a relation with the observation of
a negation of the relation. In the example, non observation of x being weakly preferred
to y does not mean we have observed x is not weakly preferred to y.
4This theory though, is easily verified ; see Appendix A.
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We define a theory as a class of structures for the language, which is closed under
isomorphism. The idea is that a theory postulates a class of structures which we believe
may represent the real world. We do not know which, if any, of these structures actually
represents the real world; this will be something we have to test. That theories must
be closed under isomorphism is postulated for technical reasons, but it is fairly intuitive
that a class of structures which is not closed under isomorphism would be strange indeed.
The reason is that, given our language, we can only describe how certain things interact,
but we cannot refer to specific structures themselves. Any two structures whose objects
interact in the same way will be indistinguishable. This notion of theory is therefore
as general as could possibly be while still being a meaningful concept. Theories will be
denoted T and T ′.
Because as economists we often want to assume that a certain theory of behavior is
implicit, we provide relative definitions of falsifiability. Our main results are a character-
ization of falsifiably complete theories and characterizations of falsifiable closure (as well
as properties of the falsifiable closure operator). We define a theory T to be falsifiably
complete with respect to T ′ if every structure in T ′ which is not in T contains a finite
data set which falsifies T , in the sense that no structure in T contains the same data set.
To see why this definition makes sense, theory T predicts that any structure outside of
T makes untrue claims. If this prediction can be empirically falsified, it means that any
structure in T ′ but not in T should generate some finite data set which is inconsistent
with T . This is precisely what our definition requires.
We show that a theory T is falsifiably complete with respect to T ′ if and only if it has
a very specific type of axiomatization. Namely, all axioms should be universal negations
of conjunctions of atomic formulas–we call this an axiomatization by UNCAF formulas.
While this sounds complicated, it actually corresponds very closely with our intuition.
A universal theory is, as it sounds, a theory which postulates a given relationship hold
universally; that is, it is an axiom formulated with a collection of ∀ symbols coming at
the beginning of the formula.
The proof that all falsifiably complete theories can be axiomatized by UNCAF for-
mulas can be naively explained as follows. Each data set that is ruled out by our theory
can be used to specify an axiom. This axiom states roughly that the observed data set
should not occur. As each data set consists of a number of statements about the primi-
tive elements of our language, this axiom can be written in an UNCAF form. That is, it
rules out the conjunction of all statements true in the data set holding simultaneously;
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and as each data set is finite, it constitutes a meaningful sentence. While this intuition is
roughly correct, the proof is slightly subtle and relies on the formal definition of a theory.
Our theorem is related to the standard intuition on falsifiability; but once it is for-
malized, falsifiability raises some subtle issues. Popper (1959) claimed that all scientific
theories must be universal, as only universal theories could be falsifiable. Popper (fa-
mously) compared two theories; the theory “all swans are white” is universal and falsifi-
able, while the theory “there is a non-white swan” is existential and not falsifiable. Most
practitioners identify falsifiability with universality.
In fact, all falsifiably complete theories are universal, but the converse is not true.
Sometimes our language lacks the expressive power to falsify our hypotheses. In other
words, our data is not of the type necessary to falsify the theory. This is why we also
require that the axioms be negations of conjunctions of atomic formulas (UNCAF). To
understand this, suppose our theory only allows us to observe weak preference, but does
not allow us to observe absence of weak preference. Consider an axiom which is simply
a negation of a single atomic formula. Such an axiom might express ∀x∀y,¬x R y. The
atomic formula here is x R y: note that the atomic formula comes in exactly the form
our data comes in. Consequently, we falsify the axiom whenever we observe a pair being
compared. By contrast, if our language only allows us to observe R, then we could never
falsify the universal axiom: ∀x∀y, x R y, as we could never observe when a pair is not
compared.
1.2 Falsifiable closures
Our results on falsifiable completeness are important as they help us to characterize the
falsifiable closure of a given theory. The falsifiable closure of T with respect to T ′ is
defined to be the largest subtheory of T ′ with respect to which T is not falsifiable. We
show that, in fact, this is a topological closure operation: it can be equivalently defined
as the smallest falsifiably complete subtheory of T ′ containing T . So, if a theory is
falsifiably complete, it is its own falsifiable closure. The relevance of this concept is that
it provides the entire empirical content of a given theory. Therefore, any two theories with
identical falsifiable closures are empirically indistinguishable. Hence, the theory of utility
maximization and the theory of weak order are not empirically distinguishable. Other
such results exist in the literature: Afriat (1967) showed that, in the theory of locally
non-satiated preference maximization on budget sets, the theory of concave, monotonic
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utility representation of preference is empirically vacuous (see Section 6.2).
Because the falsifiable closure is a topological closure, we know that the falsifiably
complete theories are closed under arbitrary intersection. Thus, for an axiomatic theory,
if each axiom generates a falsifiably complete theory, then the theory characterized by all
the axioms is itself falsifiably complete. We present examples to show that a collection
of axioms may have more empirical content taken jointly than the intersection of their
individual empirical contents, but this can only happen when falsifiable completeness
fails.
1.3 Previous literature
We are not the first to formally discuss notions of falsifiability and empirical content in an
abstract sense. Results exist in the mathematical psychology literature, as well as among
philosophers. Adams, Fagot, and Robinson (1970) seems to be the first work discussing
empirical content in a formal sense (see also Pfanzagl, Baumann, and Huber (1971) and
Adams (1992)). This work defines two theories to be empirically equivalent if the set of
all formulas (of a certain type) consistent with one theory is equivalent to the set of all
formulas (of a certain type) consistent with the other. Just as in our work, the notion
of empirical equivalence necessarily depends on what is allowed as data. The distinction
is that these works do not provide a general characterization of the axiomatic structure
of empirical content, but rather focus on characterizing the empirical content of specific
theories. Pfanzagl, Baumann, and Huber (1971) (p. 106-119) for example, simply define
testable formulas to be exactly the universal formulas.
Simon and Groen (1973) present a formal study of the testable implications of scien-
tific theories. The focus in their work is when a theory that involves theoretical terms can
be reduced to statements about observables by a process known as a Ramsey elimination.
Apart from the questions that they investigate, the main difference from our work lies in
their definition of data. They consider substructures (in the sense of mathematical logic)
to be data. Our notion of data, on the other hand, is broader. The notion of substructure
does not allow for “partial” observation, whereas our notion does. For example, given
revealed preference observations of the type x is revealed preferred to y and y is revealed
preferred to z, Simon and Groen would not allow the data to be silent about the relation
x and y stands to each other. Our notion of data allows for such partial observation, and
we believe this aspect is crucial. We discuss the alternative definition in Section 5.1, and
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argue that it is inadequate as a notion of data in economics.
Finally, some of our formal arguments are close to results by Tarski (1954). Tarski’s
main results deal with languages involving no constant or function symbols. In such
a framework, he characterizes those theories that have a universal axiomatization. As
we demonstrate below, the issue of universal axiomatization is related to falsification,
but Tarski never explored this aspect of the results. In all, our results are hardly novel
contributions to Mathematical Logic or Model Theory. Rather, we have formalized some
questions that economists in particular care about, and obtained a characterization of
the empirical content of a theory.
The presentation of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses our general notion of
theory, building from concepts in model theory. Section 3 discusses our semantic notions
of data, falsifiability, falsifiable completeness, and falsifiable closure. Section 4 contains
our main results: syntactic characterizations of the notions presented in Section 3. The
culmination of this section is Section 4.2, where we present our general results relating
to relative notions of falsifiability. In Section 5, we present some related works involving
Tarski. Section 6 is devoted to two applications: one involves unknown results on multiple
selves; the other is a presentation of Afriat’s theorem in our context. Section 7 discusses
the relation of our work to the work of Simon and Groen. Lastly, Section 8 concludes.
Appendix A shows how our results on falsifiability can be presented by the dual notion
of verifiability, and Appendix B discusses the basic notions from mathematical logic and
model theory which are required to understand our paper.
2 Theories and structures
We use standard notions from mathematical logic and model theory. To make our pa-
per self-contained, we have included an appendix with the relevant definitions: see Ap-
pendix B. The definitions are taken quite literally from Marker (2002). At the very
least, the reader should be familiar with the notions of language, structure, truth, and
isomorphism of structures.
The language we choose should correspond to those objects which we believe to be
observable as data in our theory. There are important and subtle issues involved in the
formulation of a language. For example, for studying the basic theory of rational choice,
we want a language that–at a minimum–allows us to express the observation “x is pre-
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ferred to y.” Thus we need a language which includes a binary relation symbol intended
to represent (revealed) preference. Now, if we can observe the absence of preference, “x
is not preferred to y,” we need to include a separate relation symbol corresponding to the
absence of preference. This is an important point because the absence of preference does
not need to follow from the absence of an observed preference. To incorporate the obser-
vation of absence of preference, we need to incorporate this extra relation symbol. Our
notion of data set (below) allows us to distinguish between the absence of observation
and the observation of absence; the distinction turns out to be important.
1 Remark. We use the term ‘class’ for a collection that can be described by some formula
in the language of set theory, but which may be ‘too large’ to be a set. Thus we can talk
about the ‘class of all sets’ and ‘the class of all structures of a language L’, even though
these classes are not themselves sets. For a formal treatment, see Levy (2002).
2 Definition. Let L be a language. A theory T over L is a class of structures that is
closed under isomorphism. Elements of T are called models of T .
3 Example. Consider the language L = 〈R, R˜〉 with two binary relations:
• R, which is intended to express weak preference,
• and R˜, which is intended to express absence of weak preference.
A structure of L is a triple M = (M,RM, R˜M), where M is a set, and RM and R˜M are
binary relations on M .
The theory of rationality is the theory of weak-order maximization, denoted by Two.
This is specified as the class of all structures (M,RM, R˜M) for which RM is complete
and transitive, and for all x, y ∈ M , x R˜M y if and only if x RM y is false. That is, RM
expresses weak preference, while R˜M expresses the absence of weak preference.
We can write this more carefully as follows: Two is the class of all L-structures for
which the following axioms are true:
1. ∀x∀y, (x RM y) ∨ (x R˜M y)
2. ∀x∀y,¬[(x RM y) ∧ (x R˜M y)]
3. ∀x∀y∀z,¬[(x R y) ∧ (y R z) ∧ (x R˜ z)]
4. ∀x∀y,¬[(x R˜ y) ∧ (y R˜ x)].
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The first axiom expresses that there must be either preference or absence of prefer-
ence between all pairs. The second axiom expresses consistency between preference and
absence of preference: if there is a preference between x and y, there cannot be absence
of a preference. The third formalizes transitivity, and the last formalizes completeness.
For future reference, we denote the class of all structures for which axioms 2,3, and 4
are true by Tw.
We distinguish Two from the theory of utility maximization, which is the class of
L-structures Tu for which there exists a real-valued function u : M → R such that
x R y ↔ u(x) ≥ u(y) and x R˜ y ↔ u(x) < u(y).
Finally, we can define the “vacuous theory” Tv of all the structures of L. Note that
Tu ⊆ Two ⊆ Tw ⊆ Tv. So we can express that one theory is more restrictive than another
by set containment.
4 Remark. Marker and other model theory textbooks only study first-order theories (See
Definition 17 below). In our definition of theory we follow Tarski (1954).
3 Falsifiable Closure: Semantics
5 Definition. Let L be a language. A data set D over L is given by:
1. A non-empty set D (the domain of D)
2. An n-ary relation PD over D for every n-ary relation symbol P of L
3. A function fD : Dom(fD) ⊆ Dn → D for every n-ary function symbol f of L.
4. A set C(D) of constant symbols of L and an element cD ∈ D for every c ∈ C(D).
A data set D is finite if the domain D and the sets {P |PD 6= ∅}, {f |Dom(fD) 6= ∅},
and C(D) of, respectively, relation symbols, function symbols and constant symbols that
appear in D are finite.
There are some subtle issues in the definition of data set. In particular, as we explain
in detail in Section 5.1, a data set does not impose that one observe all the theoretically
possible relations among objects in the data set. This imposition would result in a rather
unrealistic notion of data set, and our definition avoids it. We model data sets in this
way in order to capture the idea of partial observability.
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6 Definition. Let L be a language. A structureM of L contains a data set D, denoted
D ⊆M if the following conditions are satisfied:
1. D ⊆M , where D and M are the domains of D and M.
2. PD ⊆ PM for every relation symbol P
3. fD is the restriction of fM to Dom(fD) for every function symbol f .
4. cD = cM for every constant symbol c ∈ C(D).
Observe that we do not require PD to be the restriction of PM to D (and similarly
for functions). Consider the language in Example 3, and the structure M = (R,≥, <)
of Two, where ≥ is the usual order on R. Then the data set D with domain {1, 2, 3} and
the binary relation RD = {(2, 1)}, is contained in M.
7 Definition. Let L be a language.
1. A data set D falsifies a theory T if no model of T contains D.
2. LetM be a structure. A theory T is falsifiable at M ifM contains a data set that
falsifies T .
A theory T is falsified at a structureM if some claim that T makes is is incompatible
with data that could be observed if M was the structure that represents the real world.
The following lemmas establish some simple properties which are useful later.
8 Lemma. If T1 ⊆ T2 are theories and T2 is falsifiable at a structure M then T1 is also
falsifiable at M.
9 Lemma. If T1, T2 are theories that are falsifiable at a structure M then T1 ∪ T2 is
falsifiable at M.
10 Lemma. If a theory T is falsifiable at a structure M then T is falsifiable at every
isomorphic copy M′ of M.
Proof of Lemma 8. Let D ⊆ M be a finite data set that falsifies T2. Then D falsifies
T1.
Proof of Lemma 9. Let D1 and D2 be finite data sets that are contained inM and falsify
T1 and T2 respectively. Let D1 ∪D2 be the data set with domain D1 ∪D2 and such that
pD1∪D2 = pD1 ∪ pD2 for every relation symbol p, fD1∪D2 = fD1 ∪ fD2 for every function
symbol f and C(D1 ∪ D2) = C(D1) ∪ C(D2). Note that fD1 ∪ fD2 defines a function
because D1 and D2 are contained in M. Then D1 ∪ D2 falsifies T1 ∪ T2.
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Proof of Lemma 10. Let η : M′ → M be an isomorphism, and let D ⊆ M be a finite
data set with domain D that falsifies T . Let D′ ⊆ M′ be the data set with domain
D′ = η−1(D), and such that the relations and functions of D′ are the pullbacks by η of
the corresponding relations and functions of D, C(D′) = C(D) and cD′ = η−1 (cD) for
every c ∈ C(D). Then it follows from the fact that T is closed under isomorphisms that
D′ falsifies T .
11 Definition. A theory T is falsifiable if there exists some data set that falsifies T .
A theory T is falsifiable if T makes at least one claim that can be demonstrated to be
false. Consider Example 3. The theory Tu of utility maximization is falsifiable: the data
set D = (D,RD, R˜D) with domain D = {a, b} and where RD = ∅ and R˜D = {(a, b), (b, a)}
falsifies Tu.
On the other hand, while Tu is falsifiable, not all its claims are falsifiable. For an
example, consider the structure Mlex = (R2+,≥lex, <lex), where ≥lex is the lexicographic
order on R2+. It is well-known thatMlex 6∈ Tu, but no finite data set inMlex falsifies Tu.
Thus, we may be interested in theories all of whose claims are falsifiable, and more
importantly, in the empirical content of a theory such as Tu. These observations motivate
the following definitions.
12 Definition. A theory T is falsifiably complete if T is falsifiable at every structure
which is not a model of T .
13 Definition. Let T be a theory. The falsifiable closure of T , denoted fc(T ) is the class
of all structures M such that T is not falsifiable at M.
From Lemma 10 it follows that fc(T ) is a theory (i.e. closed under isomorphism).
The theory fc(T ) captures our idea of empirical content. In particular, T is falsifiably
complete if and only if fc(T ) = T .
14 Example. Consider again Example 3. Then fc(Tu) = fc(Two) = Tw. Thus, the
theory of utility maximization and the theory of preference maximization are empirically
indistinguishable. In addition, the empirical content of Tu and Two is, in a sense, contained
in axioms 2-4 of Example 3. Axiom 1 expresses a non-falsifiable property, and the
additional hypotheses implicit in Tu are also non-testable.
15 Lemma. If a theory T is falsifiable at a structure M then fc(T ) is also falsifiable at
M.
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Proof. Let D be a finite data set that is contained inM and falsifies T . By Definition 13
no model of fc(T ) contains D (since D falsifies T ). By Definition 7 this means that D
falsifies fc(T ). Since M contains D it follows that fc(T ) is falsifiable at M.
The following proposition says that the operator T 7→ fc(T ) over theories T has
the properties of a topological closure. The theory ∅ is the theory which contains no
structures.
16 Proposition. The falsifiable closure has the following properties.
Extensiveness T ⊆ fc(T ) for every theory T .
Idempotence fc(fc(T )) = fc(T ) for every theory T .
Preservation of Nullary Union fc(∅) = ∅.
Preservation of Binary Union fc(T1 ∪ T2) = fc(T1) ∪ fc(T2) for all theories T1, T2.
Proof. Extensiveness follows from the fact that T is not falsifiable at its own models.
Idempotence from Lemma 15: If M /∈ fc(T ) then T is falsifiable at M and therefore
fc(T ) is falsifiable at M, i.e. M /∈ fc(fc(T ). Preservation of nullary union follows as
every model contains a data set falsifying ∅. Preservation of binary union follows from
Lemma 9.
4 Syntax
We now formalize the assertions that can be expressed using the language L to describe
properties of L-structures. This follows the details in Appendix B. The only departure we
make from classical model theory is the inclusion of a symbol ‘ 6=’ in our meta-language,
which is always interpreted in the “correct” way. Hence, expressions in our language are
strings of symbols built from the symbols of L, variable symbols v1, v2, . . . , the equality
and inequality symbols =, 6=, Boolean connectives ¬,∨,∧, quantifiers ∃,∀ and parentheses
(, ). As we allow the symbol 6= to appear in our sentences, we need to make small changes
in our definitions of term, formula, sentence, and truth. The changes necessary should
be obvious to those familiar with mathematical logic; again, details are presented in
Appendix B.
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17 Definition. For a set Γ of sentences of L, let T (Γ) be the theory of all structuresM
of L such that all the formulas in Γ are true in M. Theories of the form T (Γ) for some
set Γ of formulas are called first-order theories. We also say that Γ axiomatizes T (Γ).
18 Example. In Example 3, the theory Two is a first order theory. The theory Tu is not
a first order theory. That Tu has no first order axiomatization may not be immediately
obvious, but follows from classical results in model theory.
19 Definition. Let L be a language. A universal negation of a conjunction of atomic
formulas (UNCAF) sentence of L is a sentence of the form
∀v1∀v2 . . . ∀vn¬ (φ1 ∧ φ2 · · · ∧ φm)
where φ1, φ2, . . . , φm are atomic formulas with variables v1, . . . , vn.
The following result provides the syntactic characterization of the semantic concept
of falsifiable completeness. Falsifiably complete theories are exactly those which have an
UNCAF axiomatization. This is our main result.
20 Theorem. A theory T is falsifiably complete if and only if it admits an UNCAF
axiomatization.
The following corollary is an immediate consequence of Theorem 20 and Definition 12.
It will be of interest to us later, in comparing our work with that of Tarski (1954).
21 Corollary. Let L be a language and T a theory over L. Then T admits an axiomati-
zation by UNCAF sentences if and only if the following condition is satisfied: For every
structure M, if every finite sub data-set of M is contained in some model of T then M
is a model of T .
The following corollary deals with finite axiomatizations. One should not necessarily
expect a theory to have a finite axiomatization, as it is equivalent to a uniform bound on
the size of a falsifying data set. For example in classical demand theory (Section 6.2), the
theory axiomatized by the weak axiom of revealed preference can always be falsified by
two observations; the strong axiom, on the other hand, is an infinite collection of axioms,
and there is no bound on a falsifying data set. We took the main idea in Corollary 22
from Vaught (1954); the proof follows from the proof of Theorem 20 and it is omitted.
22 Corollary. Let L be a language with finitely many symbols, and T a theory over L.
Then T admits an axiomatization by finitely many UNCAF sentences if and only if the
following condition is satisfied: There is an n such that, for every structure M, if every
finite sub data-set of M, whose domain has at most n elements, is contained in some
model of T then M is a model of T .
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For a theory T denote by uncaf(T ) the set of UNCAF formulas that are true in all
models of T .
Theorem 20 is an immediate consequence of Proposition 23
23 Proposition. For every theory T one has fc(T ) = T (uncaf(T )).
Let L be a language and D a finite data set. For every d ∈ D \ C(D) let vd be a
variable, and let zd for every d ∈ D be the term given by zd = c if d = cD for some
c ∈ C(D) and zd = vd if d ∈ D \ C(D). Let φD be the following UNCAF formula of L:
φD = ∀v¯¬φ¯D(v¯), where
φ¯D(v¯) =
(∧
(zd 6= zd′)
∧
P
(
zd1 , . . . , zdn
) ∧∧ f(zd1 , . . . , zdn) = zfD(d1,...,dn)) , (1)
The first conjunction ranges over all pairs d 6= d′ ∈ D; the second conjunction ranges
over all relation symbols P that appear in D and every (d1, . . . , dn) ∈ PD; and the third
conjunction ranges over all function symbols f that appear in D and every (d1, . . . , dn) ∈
Dom(fD).
24 Lemma. Let D be a finite data set. Then φD is not true in M if and only if D is
contained in some isomorphic copy of M.
Proof of Proposition 23. We divide the proof into two steps:
Step 1: If M∈ T (uncaf(T )) then M∈ fc(T ).
Let D be a data set that falsifies fc(T ). Then from Lemma 24, and the fact that T
is closed under isomorphism it follows that φD ∈ uncaf(T ). Therefore M |= φD, as by
hypothesis M ∈ T (uncaf(T )). By Lemma 24 again it follows that M does not contain
D. ThereforeM does not contain any data set that falsifies D, so that T is not falsifiable
at M, i.e. M∈ fc(T ) as desired.
Step 2: If M /∈ T (uncaf(T )) then M /∈ fc(T ).
Let φ ∈ T (uncaf(T )) be not true in M. Let v¯ = (v1, . . . , vn) be the variables of φ so
that φ = ∀v¯¬φ¯(v¯) ∈ T (uncaf(T )) where φ¯(v¯) is a conjunction of atomic formulas.
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Since φ is not true in M, it follows that then φ¯[d¯] is true in M for some d¯ =
(d1, . . . , dn). Let D be the finite data set defined as follows: The domain D ⊆M of D is
the set of all elements of the form t[d1, . . . , dk] where t is some term that appears in φ¯.
For every relation symbol P ,
PD = {(t1[d1, . . . , dk], . . . , tn[d1, . . . , dk]) |P (t1, . . . , tn) appears in φ¯}.
For every function symbol f ,
Dom(fD) = {(t1[d1, . . . , dk], . . . , tn[d1, . . . , dk]) |f [t1, . . . , tn] appears in φ¯},
and for every (t1, . . . , tn) such that the atomic formula t = f(t1, . . . , tn) appears in φ¯
fD (t1[d1, . . . , dk], . . . , tn[d1, . . . , dk]) = t[d1, . . . , dk].
If there are two different atomic formulas that appear in φ¯ with the same arguments of
f then we choose one of them arbitrarily to define the corresponding value of fD.
Then D is a data set that is contained inM and φ¯[d1, . . . , dk] is true in every structure
that contains D, and, in particular, φ is not true in any structure that contains D. But
φ is is true in every model of T , and therefore D falsifies T . Thus, we proved that M
contains the data set D that falsifies T and therefore M /∈ fc(T ).
Proof of Lemma 24. If a structure M contains D then substituting d for vd we get that
φ¯D[d¯] is false in M and therefore φD is not true in M. Since truth is preserved under
isomorphism, it follows that if an isomorphic copy of M contains D then φD is not true
in M.
Assume now that M is a structure of L such that φD is not true in M, and assume
without loss of generality that the domains M and D ofM and D are disjoint (otherwise
replace M with an isomorphic structure). Let m¯ = (md)d∈D be elements of M such
that φ¯D[m¯] is false in M. Consider the isomorphic structure of M′ which is obtained
by replacing every element md with d. Then φ¯D[d¯] is false in M′. It follows that all the
corresponding substitutions of d¯ in the atomic formulas in the conjunctions that makes
up φD in (1) are true. In particular, (d1, . . . , dn) ∈ PM′ for every relation symbol P that
appears in D and every (d1, . . . , dn) ∈ PD. Thus, PD ⊆ PM′ for every relation symbol P
that appears in D, and so property (2) in Definition 6 is satisfied. The other properties
are proved by similar argument. ThereforeM′ is an isomorphic copy ofM that contains
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D.
4.1 Joint hypotheses
We present a trivial example establishing that the falsifiable closure operator does not
commute with respect to intersection. While the falsifiable closure of two falsifiably
complete theories is the intersection of the closures, this is not true of theories that are
not falsifiably complete.
25 Example. Let the language L = 〈R, S〉 involve two unary relations. T ′ is the
vacuous theory of all structures with two unary relations. T1 is the theory axiomatized
by ∀x,R(x). T2 is the theory axiomatized by ∀x,R(x)→ ¬S(x). Note that the falsifiable
closure of T1 is T
′, while the falsifiable closure of T2 is T2 itself. Consequently, the
intersection of the falsifiable closures is T2.
However, the UNCAF axiom ∀x,¬S(x) is true in T1∩T2, while it is not true in either
T1 or T2. Consequently the falsifiable closure of T1 ∩ T2 is a proper subtheory of the
intersection of the individual falsifiable closures.
The example is trivial, but captures the essence of a familiar problem. It is possible
that two theories imposed jointly imply stronger hypotheses than just those which follow
logically from each of the two theories. Our results imply that this only happens for
theories which are not falsifiably complete.
4.2 Relative notions
It is often useful to have a relative notion of falsifiability. In some cases, there is a theory
which we postulate to be a “base” theory, and we want to test some additional hypothesis
(a stronger theory). For example, consider the theories in Example 3. We may ask about
additional empirical content in the Tu, relative to Two; and conclude that the hypotheses
that Tu adds to Two have no additional empirical content.
The theories we have been describing up until now must be necessarily completely
specified, and everything that these theories postulate must be open to testing–including
the primitives. Our results do not require such a detailed description.
To take a trivial example, we may know that there are at least three alternatives
over which an agent forms a preference. We could formalize this by ensuring that all
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structures in our theory have universes with at most three elements. It turns out that so
long as our theory is not vacuous, this theory could never be falsifiably complete. The
reason is that, if we are given any model M of our theory, and consider a substructure
M∗ ⊆M of this theory with a universe containing only two elements, thenM∗ is clearly
not a model of our theory. But our theory is also not falsifiable at M∗, as M∗ ⊆ M.
This is only a trivial example, of course, but it illustrates the need to allow for some
hypotheses to be taken as “given.”5
To discuss relative notions of falsifiability, in this section we fix two theories T ⊆ T ′.
We assume that T ′ is a “base”, or known, theory. We say that T is falsifiable with respect
to T ′ if T is falsifiable at some model of T ′. Thus a theory T is falsifiable with respect
to a weaker theory T ′ if some claim that T makes in addition to T ′ is incompatible with
data that could be observed if T ′ were true. T is falsifiably complete with respect to T ′ if
T is falsifiable at every model of T ′ which is not a model of T . The falsifiable closure of
T in T ′, denoted fcT ′(T ), is given by fcT ′(T ) = T ′ ∩ fc(T ), the class of all models M of
T ′ such that T is not falsifiable at M. Note that T is falsifiably complete with respect
to T ′ if and only if fcT ′(T ) = T . We have the following theorem:
26 Theorem. Suppose T ⊆ T ′. Then T is falsifiably complete with respect to T ′ if and
only if there exists a set Σ of UNCAF sentences of L such that T = T ′ ∩ T (Σ).
Proof of Theorem 26. If T is falsifiably complete with respect to T ′, then by Proposi-
tion 23
T = fcT ′(T ) = T
′ ∩ fc(T ) = T ′ ∩ T (Σ),
where Σ = uncaf(T ).
Assume now that T = T ′ ∩ T (Σ) for some set Σ of UNCAF sentences. In particular,
every sentence in Σ is true in every model of T and therefore Σ ⊆ uncaf(T ). It follows
that
T ′ ∩ fc(T ) = T ′ ∩ T (uncaf(T )) ⊆ T ′ ∩ T (Σ) = T,
where the first equality follows from Proposition 23 and the inclusion from the fact that
Σ ⊆ uncaf(T ). Since in addition T ⊆ T ′ ∩ fc(T ), we get that T = T ′ ∩ fc(T ), so that T
is falsifiably complete with respect to T ′.
27 Proposition. Let T ⊆ T ′ be theories. Then fcT ′(T ) is the smallest theory that
contains T and is falsifiably complete with respect to T ′.
5We may also decide to take some mathematical objects as given, so that our axiomatization only
needs to characterize economically meaningful hypotheses.
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Proof. From the fact that fc is idempotent and monotone (Proposition 16), we conclude
that
fcT ′(fcT ′(T )) = fc(fc(T ) ∩ T ′) ∩ T ′ ⊆ fc(fc(T )) ∩ T ′ = fc(T ) ∩ T ′ = fcT ′(T ).
Therefore fcT ′(T ) is falsifiably complete with respect to T
′. Assume now that T ⊆ T˜ ⊆ T ′
and T˜ is falsifiably complete with respect to T ′. Then
fcT ′(T ) ⊆ fcT ′(T˜ ) = T˜ ,
where the first inclusion follows from monotonicity of the closure and the fact that T ⊆ T˜
and the equality from the fact that T˜ is falsifiably complete with respect to T ′.
28 Example. Consider again the language L = 〈R, R˜〉. We define the theory of orders,
To, as the class of all structures satisfying
∀x∀y, [(x RM y)↔ ¬(x R˜M y)].
Then fcTo(Tu) = fcTo(Two) = Two. That is, if we assume that every pair is either ranked
or unranked (in fact, this assumption would usually be implicit), then the theory of weak
order is falsifiably complete. The theory of weak order is the falsifiable closure of the
theory of utility maximization. The idea that numerical representation of preference
is without empirical content is well-known, but it is comforting that our formal notion
coincides with our intuition in this case.
4.3 A result on axiomatizations using unobservables
Often, a theory has an axiomatization involving unobservables. Obviously, such an ax-
iomatization cannot directly lead to empirical falsification. We find conditions under
which a theoretical axiomatization can be “projected” on observables to yield a falsifi-
ably complete theory.
Let F ⊆ L be languages, such that L contains all the symbols of F and possibly
additional relation symbols. The idea is that the additional symbols in L are meant
to signify theoretical and unobservable terms. For every L-structure M, we denote by
F (M) the F -structure induced from M by forgetting the relations that corresponds
relation symbols not in F . For every L-theory T we denote by F (T ) the theory of all
structures of the form F (M) for some model M of T .
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29 Proposition. If T is a falsifiably complete L-theory then F (T ) is a falsifiably complete
F-theory.
So a theory that is falsifiably complete when we say that theoretical objects are
observable is automatically falsifiably complete in the correct observable form—as long
as the observable structures are obtained by “projection” from unobservables as in the
proposition.
5 Relation to Tarski
5.1 Data sets vs. substructures
Our notion of data sets have an important feature. One may only be able to observe some
relations among the data, not all of them. For example, for data on revealed preferences,
if one observes that x is revealed preferred to y, and that y is revealed preferred to z, one
may not know (not observe) the direction of revealed preference between x and z. Our
notion of data sets accommodates this feature of real-world data sets. The competing
notion of substructures as data sets (see the discussion in Section 7) does not.
5.2 Tarski’s result on relational systems
An UNCAF sentence is a special case of a universal sentence, i.e. a sentence of the form
∀v1 . . . vnφ(v1, . . . vn),
where φ is quantifier-free formula. A theory T admits a universal axiomatization if
T = T (Σ) for some set Σ of universal sentences.
Tarski (1954) proved the following theorem:
30 Theorem. Let L be a language without constants and function symbols and let T be
a theory over L. Then T admits axiomatization by universal sentences if and only if the
following conditions are satisfied:
1. T is closed under substructures.
2. For every structure M, if every finite substructure of M is a model of T , then M
is a model of T .
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The similarity of our condition in Corollary 21 and Tarski’s second condition is clear:
In our framework data sets replace substructures. Indeed; the reason we are able to
prove a theorem axiomatizing theories with function symbols whereas Tarski could not
is that the notion of data set allows a function to be defined on a subdomain of the
universe under consideration. In general; however, if we consider a function restricted to
an arbitrary subset of a universe, the function may not take values in that subset, and
hence the resulting object will not be a substructure. In a sense, the distinction between
functions and relations in mathematical logic is made because of the way these objects
relate across structures: in our context, they can be considered the same type of object
(any function is a relation).
We now turn to formalize the relationship between the syntactic notions of UNCAF
and universal axiomatization.
Let us say that a language L supports negation of relations if its relation symbols are
divided into pairs (P, P˜ ). The idea is that P˜ should represent the relation ‘P does not
hold’. If L supports negation of relations, we denote by ΛL the set of sentences of the
form
∀v1 . . . ∀vn¬P (v1, . . . , vn)↔ P˜ (v1, . . . , vn)
for all n-ary relation symbols p in the language. We say that a theory T respects negation
of relations if T ⊆ T (ΛL), so that P˜ is interpreted as ‘P does not hold’ in all models of
T .
31 Lemma. Let L be a language that supports negation of relations. Then for every
universal sentence φ in L there exist UNCAF sentences φ1, . . . , φn such that ΛL ` φ ↔
φ1 ∧ · · · ∧ φn.
32 Corollary. Let L be a language that supports negation of relations, and let T ⊆
T (ΛL). Then there exists a set of universal sentences Σ such that T = T (ΛL) ∩ T (Σ) if
and only if there exists a set of UNCAF sentences Σ′ such that T = T (ΛL) ∩ T (Σ). T
admits a universal axiomatization relative to T (ΛL) if and only if T admits an UNCAF
axiomatization relative to T (ΛL).
Thus, for theories that respect negation of relations our theorem and Tarski’s provide
the same type of axiomatization.
Proof of Lemma 31. We give a purely syntactic proof: Consider the universal sentence
∀v¯φ¯(v¯), where φ is quantifier free and v¯ are the variables that appear in φ. Writing φ¯ in
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its conjunctive normal form, we get that φ is equivalent to a formula of the form
∀v¯
m∧
i=1
n∨
j=1
φi,j
where each φi,j is a literal, i.e. an atomic formula or a negation of an atomic formula.
Changing the order of the conjunction and the universal quantifier we obtain a formula
of the form
m∧
i=1
∀v¯
n∨
j=1
φi,j.
Using De Morgan’s law and replacing each φi,j with its negation we get a formula of the
form
m∧
i=1
∀v¯¬
n∧
j=1
φi,j. (2)
Finally, under ΛL every literal is equivalent to an atomic formula: for every term
t0, t1, . . . , tk, ¬f(t1, . . . , tk) = t0 is equivalent to f(t1, . . . , tk) 6= t0, and ¬P (t1, . . . , tk)
is equivalent to P˜ (t1, . . . , tk). Therefore we can change the formulas φi,j in (2) to atomic
formulas and so we arrive at a conjunction of UNCAFs, as desired.
In fact, for the theory of falsifiability, it is often important that our theory support
negation of relations. Recall Popper’s theory “all swans are white.” Clearly, such a
theory could never be falsified if it were impossible to observe a swan which was not
white. The following example is our example of weak order maximization, recast in a
language involving only one relation.
33 Example. Let L = 〈R〉 be a language involving only one binary relation, interpreted
as weak preference. Consider the theory T ∗wo, where M = (M,RM) ∈ T ∗wo if and only if
RM is a weak order on M . Let T ∗v denote the vacuous theory, consisting of all structures
with binary relations. We claim that fc(T ∗wo) = T
∗
v . This means, in particular, that the
theory of weak order has no empirical content unless one can reasonably observe absence
of preference.
To see why this is the case, let D = (D,RD) be a data set, and let M = (D,RM),
where RM is the binary relation which ranks all pairs. Then D ⊆M, and M∈ T ∗wo.
The result seems surprising, but it says nothing more than the well-known fact that
the preference which is indifferent between all alternatives can rationalize any choices
whatsoever when choices are not fully observable.
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5.3 The theorem of  Los´-Tarski
Theorem ( Los´-Tarski). A first order theory is closed under substructures if and only
if it admits a universal axiomatization.
We now turn to give an analogue of  Los´-Tarski’s theorem for the case of UNCAF
axiomatizations. Let L be a language. Let M and N be structures of L with domains
M and N respectively. Recall that M is a weak substructure of N if there exists an
embedding η : M → N such that
1. η
(
fM(a1, . . . , an)
)
= fN (η(a1), . . . , η(an)) for every n-ary function symbol f
2. (a1, . . . , an) ∈ RM only if (η(a1), . . . , η(an)) ∈ RN for every n-ary relation symbol
R
3. η(cM) = cN for every constant symbol c.
34 Theorem. A first order theory is closed under weak substructures if and only if it
admits an UNCAF axiomatization.
The proof is similar to the proof of  Los´-Tarski’s Theorem and is omitted.
6 Applications
6.1 Application: Multiple selves preferences
We apply our concepts to a popular model without a known axiomatization, the model
of multiple selves. The purpose of this exercise is to demonstrate that the concepts we
introduce are useful for studying theories which have no known axiomatizations (and
hence whose empirical content is not completely understood). Models of multiple selves
are motivated by empirical observations (see e.g. Ambrus and Rozen (2008), Green and
Hojman (2008), Manzini and Mariotti (2007), O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) or Fuden-
berg and Levine (2006)), but often they lack an axiomatization in terms of observables.
Here we exhibit a broad class of such models which are falsifiably complete.
Given is a fixed and finite set of agents, the “selves.” Given is also a rule for aggregat-
ing agents’ preferences into a single preference. The interpretation is that an individual
has conflicting preferences (perhaps different preferences for different motivations) and
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reconciles these preferences with a preference aggregation rule. We observe an aggregate
preference (a revealed preference), and we would like to know whether it could be gener-
ated by the rule for some profile of agents’ preferences.6 We want to test whether or not a
specific group of selves uses a particular preference aggregation rule in making decisions,
only having observed the aggregate ranking. This question is the correct formulation of
the standard revealed-preference exercise for the multiple selves model.
Multiple selves theories are an excellent example of how hard it can be to show fal-
sifiability. The theories have a trivial existential (second-order) axiomatization: Given
a preference aggregation rule, the theory is the collection of observables for which there
exists preferences for individual selves generating the observable behavior. Leaving aside
the second-order nature of this axiomatization, the problem with an existential axioma-
tization is that we cannot conclude that the theory is falsifiable. Recall the example of
Popper (1959): the theory that there is a non-white swan is not testable because we would
need to examine all the swans in the universe. Here, for a given observed behavior, we
would need to check all possible preferences that the selves might have; for an infinite set
of alternatives, this set of preferences is vast. The fact that the axiomatization is second
order means we have to search over preference profiles–themselves extremely complicated
objects. We present a class of aggregation rules that lead to falsifiably complete theories;
theories with an UNCAF axiomatization.
We require a finite cardinality of agents, and any preference aggregation rule which
is neutral and satisfies independence of irrelevant alternatives. We show that the theory
is falsifiably complete, given that we can observe both aggregate preference and absence
of aggregate preference (and that these relations behave in the proper way).
The models relate to the theory of social choice, where there have been efforts to
axiomatize relations which are so rationalizable. When the society can be arbitrarily
large, it is known that any transitive antisymmetric relation is the Pareto relation for
some society (which may be large)–this is essentially the Szpilrajn theorem. Because
of this, any complete binary relation with a transitive asymmetric part is the result
of the Pareto extension rule for some society (we identify indifferent alternatives for the
Pareto extension rule with unranked alternatives for the Pareto ordering–see Sen (1969)).
Results for majority rule are even weaker: McGarvey (1953) showed that any complete
binary relation is the majority rule relation for some society of agents (which again may
6In this paper, we focus on preferences which are linear orders; however the results apply more
broadly.
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be large). Kalai (2004) generalizes this result to a much broader class of social choice
rules.
The current behavioral literature interprets the society as a group of conflicting ten-
dencies within an individual decision maker: multiple selves. This literature attempts to
understand the empirical content of such assumptions. In particular, Green and Hojman
(2008) generalize McGarvey’s program to choice functions. Ambrus and Rozen (2008)
give sufficient conditions (stated in terms of number of “violations” of classical rational-
ity) for a choice function to be rationalizable by conflicting selves for a fixed number of
agents. DeClippel and Eliaz (2009) provide a full characterization of choice rules which
can result from a specific social choice rule–the fallback solution on a fixed pair of agents.
We only consider preference relations and not choice functions here; however, we show
that the predictions of nearly every such model can be empirically falsified even in the
case where we hypothesize a finite and known cardinality of “selves.”7
There are very few results like ours, assuming a fixed and finite population of selves.
Dushnik and Miller (1941) give necessary and sufficient conditions for a binary relation to
be the intersection of a pair of linear orders; this can dually be seen as an axiomatization
for binary relations which are the image of the Pareto extension rule for two agents.
This characterization theorem both relies on existential quantification, and is not a first
order characterization.8 Dushnik and Miller (1941)’s existential axiomatization cannot
be the basis for falsification.9 Sprumont (2001) provides a similar characterization in
a restricted case. Both of these results are of interest as those relations which are the
intersection of a pair of linear orders are exactly those relations which can be rationalized
by the Pareto-extension rule.
We work with neutral preference aggregation rules which satisfy independence of
irrelevant alternatives. By working with such preference aggregation rules, we need not
specify what the global set of alternatives is in advance. A set of agents N is fixed and
finite. A preference aggregation rule is therefore defined to be a mapping carrying any set
of alternatives X and any N vector of linear orders10 (termed a preference profile) over
those alternatives (R1, ..., Rn) to a complete binary relation over X. We write Rf(R1,...,Rn)
for the binary relation which results (suppressing notation for dependence on X). We
7It is surprisingly more difficult to axiomatize such models for a fixed and known set of selves, than
for an arbitrary set of agents.
8That is, it involves quantification over relations.
9In particular, the theory of Pareto relations for n agents was not known to be falsifiably complete.
Our Theorem 36 demonstrates that it is.
10A linear order is complete, transitive, and anti-symmetric
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assume the following property:
35 Definition. (Neutrality and Independence of irrelevant alternatives): For all sets X
and Y , for all x, y ∈ X and all w, z ∈ Y and all preference profiles (R1, ..., Rn) over
X and (R′1, ..., R′n) over Y , if for all i ∈ N , x Ri y ⇔ w R′i z, then x Rf(R1,...,Rn) y ⇔
w Rf(R′1,...,R′n) z.
11
This hypothesis embeds both the neutrality and independence of irrelevant alterna-
tives assumptions. These assumptions seem to be the minimal assumptions needed to
apply Theorem 30.
Given f , we will say that a binary relation R on a set X is f -rationalizable if there
exists a profile of linear orders (R1, ..., Rn) for which R = Rf(R1,...,Rn).
Denote by L = 〈R, R˜〉 the language involving two binary relations, and let T (ΛL) be
the theory of all structures satisfying the axiom
∀x∀y, xRMy ↔ ¬xR˜My.
A structure is f -rationalizable if RM is f -rationalizable and xRMy ↔ ¬xR˜My. The
class of f -rationalizable structures is denoted Tf . Note that Tf is in fact a theory, as it
is closed under isomorphism (this is the content of neutrality).
36 Theorem. For every f , Tf is falsifiably complete with respect to T (ΛL).
37 Remark. If absence of ranking is unobservable, that is if we consider the language
that include only a single relation symbol R, then the theory of all structures in which
R is an aggregation of n linear orders is not falsifiably complete. The easiest example is
when the aggregation rule is such that xRf(R1,...,Rn)y for every x, y, R1, . . . , Rn. Then the
theory is axiomatized by ∀x∀yxRy, which is not falsifiably complete.
Proof. We first show that Tf has a universal axiomatization; the result then follows
immediately from Corollary 32.
We use Theorem 30 to show that Tf is universally axiomatizable.
We must verify that Tf satisfies the following two properties:
11Formally, neutrality means that social rankings should be independent of the names of alternatives,
and independence of irrelevant alternatives means that the social preference between a pair of alternatives
should depend only on the individual preferences between that pair. We have collapsed these two
hypotheses into one larger condition.
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1. Closure under substructures: If A ∈ T , and A′ is a substructure of A, then A′ ∈
T .12
2. Finite substructure property: If for all finite substructures A′ of A, A′ ∈ T , then
A ∈ T .13
The first property is obviously satisfied; it follows from the neutrality and IIA as-
sumption.
To prove that the second is satisfied, let A be an arbitrary structure for the language
L, and suppose that for all finite substructures A′ of A, A′ ∈ T . A structure consists of
a set X and a complete binary relation RM on X, where R˜
M
is a binary relation which
is the complement of RM. The assumption that for all finite substructures A′, A′ ∈ T
means that for all finite subsets Y ⊆ X, RM|Y is f -rationalizable. We need to show that
RM on X is also f -rationalizable.
To this end, consider {0, 1} endowed with the discrete topology. Identify the set of
binary relations on X with B = {0, 1}X×X and topologize with the product topology.
Then B is a compact topological space. Denote the set of f -rationalizable binary relations
on X by Bf . For x, y ∈ X, let Bx,y = {B ∈ Bf : B(x, y) = RM(x, y)}. Note that for
all (x, y), Bx,y is nonempty.
14 We now seek to show that it is a closed subset of B.
To see this, note that for all B ∈ Bx,y, by definition, there exists a preference profile
(R1, ..., Rn) for which B = Rf(R1,...,Rn). For each B ∈ Bx,y, choose one such profile.
Suppose {Bλ}λ∈Λ ⊆ Bx,y is a net converging to some B. By compactness of B, we may
without loss of generality assume that (R1λ, ..., R
n
λ) → (R1, ..., Rn) (see Kelley (1955), p.
71). In particular, it is easy to verify that each Ri is a linear order (by definition of
product topology convergence). Also by definition limλ∈ΛRf(R1λ,...,Rnλ) = B. The limit can
be passed through f .15 Conclude that Rf(R1,...,Rn) = B. Clearly, B(x, y) = R
M(x, y).
Conclude that B ∈ Bx,y, so that Bx,y is closed.
12A structure A′ = (X ′, R′) is a substructure of A = (X,R) if X ′ ⊆ X and R|X′ = R′.
13A structure A = (X,R) is finite if X is finite.
14This follows from the fact that RM|{x,y} is f -rationalizable. This implies that there exist linear
orders (R1, ..., Rn) on {x, y} for which Rf(R1,...,Rn) = RM|{x,y}. The argument now follows from the
Szpilrajn theorem, by taking appropriate extensions of Ri for all i and appealing to independence of
irrelevant alternatives.
15To see this, note that for all x, y ∈ X by definition of convergence, there exists λ∗ ∈ Λ for which
for all λ ≥ λ∗ and for all i ∈ N , Riλ(x, y) = Ri(x, y). Recall that for a pair x, y ∈ X for which x 6= y
and a linear order R over X, R|{x,y} is determined by R(x, y). As Riλ(x, y) = Ri(x, y) for all i ∈ N
and λ ≥ λ∗, we may conclude that Rf(R1λ,...,Rnλ)|{x,y} = Rf(R1,...,Rn)|{x,y} for all such λ. Therefore,
Rf(R1λ,...,Rnλ) → Rf(R1,...,Rn).
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Now, we claim that
⋂
(x,y)∈X×X Bx,y 6= ∅. To show this, we will show that for every
finite set Z ⊆ X×X, ⋂(x,y)∈Z Bx,y 6= ∅ and appeal to the finite intersection property. So,
let Z ⊆ X ×X be finite. Let Y = Z1 × Z2, where Zi denotes the projection of Z on the
ith coordinate. Note that Y is finite; so by hypothesis, RM|Y is f -Pareto rationalizable.
Let (R1, ..., Rn) be linear orders on Y for which Rf(R1,...,Rn) = R
M|Y . Each of these can
be extended to linear orders on all of X by the Szpilrajn theorem, say to Ri∗. Then
Rf(R1∗,...,Rn∗)|Y = RM|Y (this follows from the neutrality and independence of irrelevant
alternatives hypothesis). In particular, for all (x, y) ∈ Z, Rf(R1∗,...,Rn∗)(x, y) = RM(x, y),
so that
⋂
(x,y)∈Z Bx,y 6= ∅. This verifies the finite intersection property, and as each Bx,y
is closed and B is compact, we conclude that ⋂(x,y)∈X×X Bx,y 6= ∅. This establishes that
RM ∈ Bf .
The above discussion assumes that preferences are linear orders, but many of the
multiple-selves papers put different restrictions on the selves’ preferences. While the
proof above does not directly apply, it is easy to see that the theorem is true on different
domains of preference profiles: Any domain of preference profiles which is closed in the
product topology as defined above will work.
6.2 Application: Afriat’s theorem
Afriat’s theorem (Afriat, 1967; Varian, 1982) states that consumption data are rationaliz-
able by a monotonic, continuous, and concave utility if and only if they are rationalizable
by a locally nonsatiated preference. Similarly, for demand data satisfying Walras’ Law,
data which are rationalizable at all are rationalizable by a monotonic, continuous, and
concave utility. We shall recast his theorem, using our results, as a statement about the
empirical content (the falsifiable closure) of the theory of concave utility maximization.
The language and definitions are similar to those of Example 3, but we need to make
some changes to model that preferences are revealed by demand choices at competitive
budgets.
Let Π ⊆ Rn++ ×R+. A function d : Π→ Rn+ that satisfies
1. p · d(p, I) = I, and
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2. d(p, I) = d(λp, λI) for all λ > 0 such that (λp, λI) ∈ Π
is a demand function.
Let L be a language with two binary relations, R and P . The language should also
include a constant symbol for every element of Rn+ and R.
16 We shall introduce three
theories: the theory T ′ of classical demand theory, the subtheory T ′wo of weak-order
maximization, and the subtheory Tc of concave utility maximization.
First, T ′ is the class of all structures isomorphic to some M of L with M = Rn+, all
constant symbols refer to their named objects, and for which there is a demand function
d and Π ⊆ RN++ ×R+, such that
• (x, y) ∈ R if and only if there is (p, I) ∈ Π such that x = d(p, I) and p · y ≤ I;
• (x, y) ∈ P if and only if there is (p, I) ∈ Π such that x = d(p, I) and p · y < I.
Second, the theory of weak order maximization is the subtheory T ′wo of T
′ defined as
structures isomorphic to some (Rn+, R
∗, P ∗) in T ′ for which there is a complete, reflexive,
and transitive binary relation  on X such that
(x, y) ∈ R∗ ⇒ (x, y) ∈
(x, y) ∈ P ∗ ⇒ (x, y) ∈ .
The theory of concave utility maximization is the subtheory Tc of T
′ that is the class
of all structures isomorphic to some (Rn+, R
∗, P ∗) in T ′ for which there is a monotonic
and concave function u : Rn+ → R such that
(x, y) ∈ R∗ ⇒ u(x) ≥ u(y)
(x, y) ∈ P ∗ ⇒ u(x) > u(y).
We obtain the following expression of Afriat’s (1967) theorem:
38 Theorem. T ′wo is the falsifiable closure of Tc with respect to T
′.
16We introduce constant symbols for each element of Rn+ so that we do not need to worry about
describing consumption space and the relation ≥ , the function ·, etc. as part of the problem. The
technique of introducing a constant to represent every element in some concrete set is very useful in
a variety of contexts in which the underlying set is something whose behavior is well-understood, but
whose defining symbols are not meant to be taken as data. Otherwise, we would need to take ≥ and the
values of the function · as “observable data.”
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Proof. Consider the set Σ = {φn, : n = 2, . . .} of UNCAF formulas, where φn is
∀v1, . . . ,∀vn(¬(v1, v2) ∈ R ∨ ¬(v2, v3) ∈ R∨, . . . ,∨¬(vn, v1) ∈ P ).
By a well-known theorem (see Richter (1966) and Suzumura (1976)), if a structure
(X,R∗, P ∗) satisfies these sentences, then it is in T ′wo. And if a structure (X,R
∗, P ∗) is
in T ′wo, it is clear to see it satisfies these sentences. So (X,R
∗, P ∗) ∈ T ′wo if and only if it
is in T ′ and satisfies the formulas in Σ. Then, by Theorem 26 T ′wo = T
′ ∩ T (Σ) implies
that T ′wo is falsifiably complete with respect to T
′, as the formulas in Σ are all UNCAF.
Note that for (X,R∗, P ∗) in T ′, the interpretation of the sentences in Σ is that the
strong axiom of revealed preference holds.17 Note that it is meaningful to talk about
a finite data set as “satisfying” a collection of sentences in this case, so long as the
sentences do not refer to any constants. This is because there are no function symbols
in our language. A data set in this context is a structure for our language ignoring
constants. Formally, Afriat’s theorem then states that if a finite data set (D,RD, PD)
satisfies the sentences in Σ, there is a structure (X,R∗, P ∗) in Tc containing it.
Let (X,R∗, P ∗) be a structure in T ′wo \ Tc, and let D be a finite data set contained in
(X,R∗, P ∗). It is easy to verify that each of the axioms in Σ are true for D. So, there
exists M∈ Tc containing D by the argument implied by Afriat’s theorem.
Since T ′wo is falsifiably complete, we conclude that T
′
wo is the falsifiable closure of Tc
with respect to T ′.
7 Other notions of refutability
We are not the first to formalize the notions of falsification and Popper’s logical posi-
tivism. We discussed the work of Adams, Fagot, and Robinson (1970), Adams (1992)
and Pfanzagl, Baumann, and Huber (1971) in the introduction. The excellent book by
Luce, Krantz, Suppes, and Tversky (1990) discusses these contributions. Here, we dis-
cuss an approach whose formalism is more similar to ours. In a series of papers, Herbert
Simon and coauthors (Simon and Groen, 1973; Simon, 1979, 1983, 1985; Rynasiewicz,
1983; Shen and Simon, 1993) discuss a notion of falsifiability, and the formal structure
17In first-order logic, the strong axiom is an infinite number of axioms, as we make evident here.
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of falsifiable theories. The focus of this work, as we mentioned in the introduction, is on
the elimination of theoretical terms.
This literature has based the idea of falsification on the notion of data as a sub-
structure. We now discuss their notion of falsification, and argue that substructures are
inadequate as a notion of data. The definition of falsifiability was proposed by Simon
and Groen (1973).18 They intend their definition to capture the theories that can be
axiomatized using only universal quantifiers.
A structure M is finite if its domain M is finite.
39 Definition. A theory T is finitely testable if there is a structure M that is not a
model of T , and if, for every structure M that is not a model of T , M has a finite
substructure that is not a model of T .
40 Definition. A theory T is irrevocably testable if no model of T has a finite substruc-
ture that is not a model of T .
Thus T is finitely and irrevocably testable (FIT) if there is a structure that is not
a model of T , and if for every structure M, M is not a model of T if and only if M
contains a finite substructure that is not a model of T . That is,M is a model of T if and
only if every finite substructure of M is a model of T . Note that this latter condition
also appears in Theorem 30, on relational systems. FIT is the notion of falsifiability used
by Simon and Groen. It build on substructures as a notion of data. Note that a relative
definition exists: for T ⊆ T ′, T is FIT with respect to T ′ if there exists a structure in T ′
that is not a model of T , and if for every structure M ∈ T ′, M is not a model of T if
and only if M contains a finite substructure that is not a model of T .
41 Proposition. If a theory satisfies FIT then it is closed under substructures.
Proof. Let T satisfy FIT. Let M be a structure in T . If M has a substructure that is
not in T then this substructure has a finite substructure B that is not in T . But B is
also a substructure of M, so FIT implies that M is not in T . It follows that M cannot
have any substructure that is not a model of T .
By Proposition 41 and the  Los´-Tarski Theorem, FIT implies a universal axiomati-
zation whenever T is a first order theory. The relation between falsifiability and the
 Los´-Tarski Theorem is, we hope, clear from our results in Section 5.3.
18Rynasiewicz (1983) proposes a different notion, which he calls “finitely strongly falsifiable.” One
can show that example 42 presents a theory that is falsifiably complete, and closed under substructures,
but is not finitely strongly falsifiable.
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The following example shows that a theory T may be falsifiably complete with respect
to another theory T ′ [Definition 12], but fail to be FIT (with respect to T ′). The example
points out that FIT-ness may fail simply because there are no finite substructures of a
theory. This can occur for technical reasons related to the definition of substructure.
42 Example. Consider the language L = 〈0, q, <, f〉 where q is an unary relation symbol,
< is a binary relation symbol, f is a one-place function symbol, and 0 is a constant symbol.
Let T ′ be the class of structures isomorphic to some M = (Z, 0M, qM, <M, fM) where
0M is 0 in Z, <M is a linear order and x <M fM(x).
Let T be the class of structures in T ′ where the formula
∀x¬q(x)
is true. Then by Theorem 26, T is falsifiably complete with respect to T ′.
T is also closed under substructures because, if (Z, 0M, qM, <M, fM) is isomorphic to
a model of T and B is a substructure of M, then qB coincides with the qM on |B|.
On the other hand, no model of T ′ contains any finite substructures. Suppose, to the
contrary, that B is a substructure ofM∈ T ′ and that |B| is finite. Then |B| has a largest
element z¯ according to <B. Note that fB = fM||B| and z¯ <M fM(z¯) = fB(z¯) ∈ |B|. But
z¯, fB(z¯) ∈ |B| and z¯ <M fB(z¯) imply that z¯ <B fB(z¯), which contradicts that z¯ was the
largest element of |B|.
Consequently, if T were to satisfy FIT with respect to T ′, it must contain every model
of T ′, which is false. It follows that T does not satisfy FIT with respect to T ′.
A theory may satisfy FIT but fail to be falsifiably complete; a simple example involves
one unary relation R and theory T axiomatized by ∀R(x).
8 Conclusion
We have developed a theory of the empirical content of an economic theory. The leading
examples, throughout the paper, are borrowed from revealed-preference theory; they
should be familiar to most economists. We have also shown that the results are applicable
to less well-understood theories, and can give new substantive results. In particular, we
have illustrated the usefulness of our results by presenting conditions under which theories
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of multiple-selves in behavioral economics, and theories of preference aggregation in social
choice, are falsifiably complete. That is, all its claims are fully testable.
A recurring methodological issue in economics is the argument over unreal assump-
tions. There is an early literature, sparked by Milton Friedman’s 1953 position that the
truth of assumptions does not matter. Recent methodological discussions by Rubinstein
(2006), Gul and Pesendorfer (2008), Dekel and Lipman (2009), and Gilboa (2009), deal
with (among other issues) whether the truth of the “story” behind a theory is relevant.
In our results, assumptions and stories do not appear explicitly. They appear implicitly
in the specification of concrete theories (see for example the theories in Example 3, and
Sections 6.1 and 6.2). This is because we have focused on the testable implications of a
theory: an UNCAF axiomatization can be seen as a test for the theory.
However, the framework we have laid out is applicable to the treatment of theoretical
objects. We have already mentioned one venue for application using Proposition 29; this
result can in fact be applied to study the testable implications of Nash equilibrium or
Nash bargaining, something we omitted from the paper because the details are involved
and the paper is already long as it is. A second illustration lies in Paul Samuelson’s (see
Archibald, Simon, and Samuelson (1963)) response to Friedman’s position on assump-
tions. Samuelson effectively counters Friedman by using ideas that we have formalized
in our paper. Samuelson makes the point that assumptions matter because either a the-
ory T (described by its “assumptions”) is falsifiably complete and thus equivalent to its
empirical content, in which case Friedman’s point is moot; or it makes non-falsifiable
claims, in which case the failure to refute the theory is uninformative about the theory’s
non-falsifiable claims. In fact, Samuelson argues, by Occam’s Razor one should choose
the weaker theory, consisting of the empirical content of T (what we have formally termed
fc(T )), rather than unnecessary claims in T . Regardless of one’s position on the question
of realism, we hope that this example shows how our notions may be useful.
Finally, we have studied basic ideas from philosophical positivism. They are seen
as naive by some philosophers because researchers may have complicated agendas, and
be motivated by their environment, in ways that makes falsification not the focus of
their research. Philosophy of science since Popper has therefore focused on the sociology
of what drives actual research. We are not expert on these matters, of course, but it
seems to us that most economists still find the problem of falsification interesting. In
fact, the recent methodological discussions in Gul and Pesendorfer (2008), Dekel and
Lipman (2009), and Gilboa (2009), all take for granted that one wants to understand a
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theory’s empirical content (possible exceptions are Hicks (1983) and Rubinstein (2006)).
We believe that a formal understanding of empirical content is useful, independently of
the complexities involved in the actual production of research.19
19Gilboa (2009; Chapter 7.3) presents this viewpoint very convincingly.
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Appendix A The dual of falsifiable completeness
We have so far discussed falsifiability as a primitive notion, but falsifiability has a dual
concept: verifiability. The simplest way to explain these concepts using those we already
have is as follows. We can say that a theory T is verifiably complete with respect to T ′
if T ′\T is falsifiably complete with respect to T ′. Hence, just as falsifiable completeness
specifies that all claims of a theory should be falsifiable, verifiable completeness specifies
that all claims should be verifiable. Falsifying the complement of a theory is the same as
verifying the theory itself–in this sense, falsification and verification are dual.
We can then define the verifiable interior of a theory T with respect to T ′, viT ′(T ) =
T ′\fcT ′(T ′\T ). Thus, the verifiable interior of a theory T with respect to T ′ is the largest
subtheory of T which is verifiably complete. It corresponds to the weakest strengthening
of the hypotheses for which the theory becomes verifiably complete. Unsurprisingly, the
verifiable interior operation is a topological interior, corresponding to the same topology
as the falsifiable closure.
Lastly, we can define a sentence to be an ECAF (existential conjunction of atomic
formulas) if it is a sentence of the form
∃v1∃v2...∃vn(φ1 ∧ φ2... ∧ φn)
where each φi is an atomic formula.
The following result is a trivial consequence of Theorem 26.
43 Theorem. A theory T is verifiably complete with respect to T ′ if and only if there
exists a set of ECAF sentences, Λ, for which T = (
⋃
λ∈Λ T (λ)) ∩ T ′.
We present here a simple example of a theory which is verifiably complete.
44 Example. The example here is one in which we study a private-goods economy,
where each individual has her own consumption. We will thus speak of allocations. The
theory of egalitarian equivalence of some specified allocation, described by Pazner and
Schmeidler (1978), asks whether there is some fixed consumption bundle for which each
individual is indifferent between her private consumption and the fixed consumption.
To model this, we will suppose that each individual has a preference, and we will
consider some fixed allocation; this fixed allocation will be specified in our language by
constant symbols.
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The language L involves n binary predicates R1, ..., Rn and n constant symbols,
c1, ..., cn. The theory that (c1, ..., cn) is an egalitarian equivalent allocation is axioma-
tized by the following sentence:
∃x
n∧
i=1
(xRici ∧ ciRix)
.
This axiom is immediately seen to be of the ECAF form; hence the theory that
(c1, ..., cn) is egalitarian equivalent is a verifiably complete theory. This is intuitive, as to
verify that the theory holds, one must simply demonstrate the existence of x to which
each individual is indifferent.
Appendix B Basic definitions from Model Theory
The following definitions are taken, for the most part, quite literally from (Marker, 2002),
pp. 8-12. We refer readers to this excellent text for more details; but present the basics
here to keep the analysis self-contained. The x notation is here used to denote a list, or
vector, or elements (x1, ..., xm).
We first must specify our language L. The language is a primitive and specifies the
syntax, or the things we can say.
45 Definition. A language L is given by specifying the following:
1. a set of function symbols F and positive integers nf for each f ∈ F
2. a set of relation symbols R and positive integers nR for each R ∈ R
3. a set of constant symbols C.
The semantics are specified by concrete mathematical objects, called structures. Struc-
tures provide the appropriate framework for interpreting our syntax.
46 Definition. An L-structure M is given by the following:
1. a nonempty set M called the universe or domain of M
2. a function fM : Mnf →M for each f ∈ F
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3. a set RM ⊆MnR for each R ∈ R
4. an element cM ∈M for each c ∈ C.
When the language L is understood, we refer to an L-structure simply as a structure.
The elements fM, RM, and cM are called interpretations of the corresponding symbols
in the language L.
It is useful to be able to give a meaning to certain relations across structures. For
example, in our case, we have reason to study both the notion of substructure and
isomorphism. The following makes these precise.
47 Definition. Suppose that M and N are L-structures with universes M and N
respectively. An L-embedding η : M → N is a one-to-one map η : M → N that
preserves the interpretations of all symbols of L: specifically,
1. η(fM(a1, ..., anf )) = f
N (η(a1), ..., η(anf )) for all f ∈ F and a1, ..., anf ∈M
2. (a1, ..., amR) ∈ RM if and only if (η(a1), ..., η(amR)) ∈ RN for all R ∈ R and
a1, ..., amR ∈M
3. η(cM) = cN for c ∈ C.
48 Definition. An isomorphism is a bijective L-embedding.
49 Definition. M is a substructure of N if M ⊆ N and the inclusion map ι : M → N
defined by ι(m) = m for all m ∈M is an L-embedding.
The following definition gives us the basic building blocks of our syntax. Note that
we include a countable list of “variables” to be used in this definition; these are not part
of the language per se, but rather part of a “meta language” in that they are present in
all languages.
50 Definition. The set of L-terms is the smallest set T E such that
1. c ∈ T E for each constant symbol c ∈ C
2. each variable symbol vi ∈ T E for i = 1, 2, ...,
3. if t1, ..., tnf ∈ T E and f ∈ F , then f(t1, ..., tnf ) ∈ T E .
The following definitions mark our departure from Marker. Specifically, we want to
allow atomic formulas to include expressions involving the 6= sign–and we want to include
this symbol as part of our meta-language, in the sense that it is present in every language.
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51 Definition. Say that φ is an atomic L-formula if φ is one of the following
1. t1 = t2, where t1 and t2 are terms
2. t1 6= t2, where t1 and t2 are terms
3. R(t1, ..., tnR), where R ∈ R and t1, ..., tnR are terms
52 Definition. The set of L-formulas is the smallest set W containing the atomic
formulas such that
1. if φ is in W , then ¬φ is in W
2. if φ and ψ, then (φ ∧ ψ) and (φ ∨ ψ) are in W
3. if φ is in W , then ∃viφ and ∀viφ are in W .
53 Definition. A variable v occurs freely in a formula φ if it is not inside a ∃v or ∀v
quantifier. It is bound in φ if it does not occur freely in φ.
54 Definition. A sentence is a formula φ with no free variables.
We are now prepared to define a concept of “truth” relating syntax and semantics.
We want to define what it means for a sentence to be true in a given structure. The
notion we define here is slightly different than Marker, as it again relies on the correct
interpretation of the 6= symbol, which is not a primitive there (nor in any other standard
text).
55 Definition. Let φ be a formula with free variables from v = (vi1 , ..., vim), and let
a = (ai1 , ..., aim) ∈ Mm. We inductively define M |= φ(a) as follows. The notation
M 6|= ψ(a) means that M |= φ(a) is not true.
1. If φ is t1 = t2, then M |= φ(a) if tM1 (a) = tM2 (a)
2. If φ is t1 6= t2, then M |= φ(a) if tM1 (a) 6= tM2 (a)
3. If φ is R(t1, ..., tnR), then M |= φ(a) if (tM1 (a), ..., tMnR(a)) ∈ RM
4. If φ is ¬ψ, then M |= φ(a) if M 6|= ψ(a)
5. If φ is (ψ ∧ θ), then M |= φ(a) if M |= ψ(a) and M |= θ(a)
6. If φ is (ψ ∨ θ), then M |= φ(a) if M |= ψ(a) or M |= θ(a)
7. If φ is ∃vjψ(v, vj), then M |= φ(a) if there is b ∈M such that M |= ψ(a, b)
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8. If φ is ∀vjψ(v, vj), then M |= φ(a) if for all b ∈M , M |= ψ(a, b).
56 Definition. M satisfies φ(a) or φ(a) is true in M if M |= φ(a).
Lastly, for our purposes, it is useful to have a notion of a universal sentence.
57 Definition. A universal sentence or universal formula is a sentence of the form
∀vφ(v), where φ is quantifier free.
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